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Hett, Benjamin Carter – Burning the Reichstag. An Investigation into the Third 
Reich’s Enduring Mystery. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 413.
Burning the Reichstag is an intervention in the long and bitter debate about who set 
fire to the Reichstag on February 27, 1933. More importantly, it is an examination 
of how historians’ interpretations of this episode of Nazi history were influenced 
by former Nazis seeking to resume careers in the Federal Republic and those 
who assisted them in doing so, the dynamics of the Cold War, and possibly some 
historians’ fear of public calumny and libel suits. The book has much to teach 
about the methods by which powerful individuals and states have manipulated, and 
presumably still manipulate, interpretations of events past and present. 
The blaze that gutted the chamber in which the German parliament met took 
place four weeks after Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor and one week before 
a critical national election. Hitler promptly claimed that the fire had been set by 
Communists, and in doing so succeeded in frightening the conservative German 
President, Paul von Hindenburg, into granting the national government wide 
ranging emergency powers to limit freedom of speech, to ban public meetings, to 
arrest individuals who threatened security, and “temporarily” to assume control of 
Land (provincial) governments when necessary to restore order. The police and the 
S.A., the Nazi Party’s paramilitary organization, promptly arrested thousands of 
Communists and socialists, thereby promoting Nazi fortunes in the election held on 
March 5, 1933. In the weeks that followed the election, Hitler seized control of the 
remaining independent Land governments. 
While many contemporaries suspected that Hitler or close associates had 
ordered the arson to create panic and to provide an excuse to take harsh measures 
against political opponents, the new authoritarian government of Germany looked 
for the culprits on the political Left. In a trial that began in September 1933, German 
prosecutors charged one German and three foreign Communists with the crime, as 
well as a troubled and partially blind Dutch former Communist who had been found 
in the Reichstag building as it burned and who claimed to have set the fire himself, 
Marinus van der Lubbe. The case against the four Communists was so weak that the 
German Supreme Court refused to convict them; van der Lubbe was found guilty 
and guillotined. The Nazi regime clung to the story that van der Lubbe had acted on 
behalf of Communists despite the verdict in the trial. 
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After the war, historians on both sides of the Iron Curtain argued that the fire had 
most likely been set by the Nazis themselves, although Hitler’s own involvement 
was often left unclear.1 In 1959, the postwar consensus was challenged by an 
official of the Interior Ministry of the West German Land of Lower Saxony, Fritz 
Tobias, who argued in a series of articles published in the West German weekly 
magazine Der Spiegel that van der Lubbe was alone responsible for the Reichstag 
fire. According to Tobias, Hitler and his inner circle had been surprised by the news 
of the fire and had genuinely believed that Communists were the culprits. Tobias 
attacked the credibility of experts who examined the building shortly after the fire 
and who concluded that chemicals must have been used to speed up the blaze. He 
also dismissed as “historical falsifications” accounts of former Nazi insiders who 
reported after the war or, in one case, while in exile, that in 1933 they had learned of 
admissions of responsibility by Nazis.2
Following the publication of Tobias’ articles and, in 1962, book, several 
prominent British historians who had previously held the Nazis responsible for 
the Reichstag fire confessed to error. A. J.P . Taylor wrote in an introduction to the 
abridged English translation of Tobias’ book that “on the Reichstag Fire I was as 
wrong as everyone else; and I am grateful to Herr Tobias for putting me right .... Herr 
Tobias has performed a great service for all those who believe in truly free inquiry.”3 
Alan Bullock, famous for his biography of Hitler, wrote in a review that he also 
was inclined to revise his views. Tobias, wrote Bullock, had been motivated solely 
by “an obsession to get at the truth.” “[E]xonerating the Nazis . . . was not Tobias’ 
purpose, nor is it a consequence of his investigations.” Bullock did express some 
curiosity, however, about “why, with great persistence, [Tobias] dug away for years 
at the evidence . . . .”4 The fact that Soviet bloc historians and other Communists 
vociferously supported the theory that Nazis had set the fire likely helped Tobias 
persuade both Taylor and Bullock to revise their views; mendacity demonstrably 
tainted much Soviet history of the modern era. The apparent even-handedness of 
Tobias’ interpretation also lent it a certain attractiveness. Tobias rejected both the 
Nazi theory that Communists had set the fire and the Communist view that it had 
been the Nazis.
In West Germany as well Tobias’ articles and book prompted a rethinking of 
interpretations of the Reichstag fire. In 1964, Hans Mommsen, then a junior scholar 
working at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte, published an article in the Vierteljahrshefte 
1 See, for example, Alan Bullock, Hitler. A Study in Tyranny (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), pp. 237-
238; Karl Dietrich Bracher, Wolfgang Sauer, Gerhard Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung. 
Studien zur Errichtung des totalitären Herrschaftssystems in Deutschland 1933/34 (Cologne: Westdeutscher 
Verlag, 1960), pp. 80-1.
2 Fritz Tobias, Der Reichstagsbrand. Legende und Wirklichkeit (Rastatt: Grote, 1962), pp. 239-44, 530-50; see 
also Fritz Tobias, “Auch Fälschungen haben lange Beine. Des Senatspräsidenten Rauschnings ‘Gespräche mit 
Hitler’,” in Karl Corino, ed., Gefälscht! Betrug in Politik, Literatur, Wissenschaft, Kunst und Musik, (Frankfurt/
Main, 1996), pp. 91-105.
3 A. J. P. Taylor, Introduction to Fritz Tobias, The Reichstag Fire. Legend and Truth, translated by Arnold 
Pomerans (London: Secker & Warburg, 1964, first edition 1963), p. 16.
4 Alan Bullock, “The Big Frame-up,” The Spectator, November 29, 1963 (archive.spectator.co.uk/article/29th-
november-1963/32/the-big-frame-up, accessed on August 14, 2016). See also Hugh Trevor-Roper, “Accounting 
for Hitler,” The New York Review of Books (April 2, 1964).
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für Zeitgeschichte that adopted Tobias’ interpretation. In the same article, Mommsen 
proposed a general theory of the nature of Nazi rule, one that made Hitler’s 
supposedly ad hoc response to the Reichstag fire a paradigm for Nazi conduct more 
generally. Mommsen suggested that “National Socialism, in contrast to Bolshevism, 
did not possess a purposeful, well planned revolutionary strategy, but rather thanked 
for many of its successes impatient, rash, mostly on the spot immediate decisions 
that demonstrated a great deal of flexibility regarding its general goals.”5 The theory 
proved highly influential in the decades that followed.6 
Hett has found an answer to Bullock’s question about the reason for Tobias’ 
persistence in investigating the Reichstag fire. In Burning the Reichstag, Hett 
suggests that “there are hints that Tobias’ work on the Reichstag fire might have 
been at least in part the product of an official commission.” (p. 277) After Hett’s 
book appeared, archivists at the German National Archives, which housed Tobias’ 
papers following his death in 2011, found direct evidence that supported Hett’s 
claim. In a 1963 memorandum directed to his superiors in Lower Saxony, Tobias 
explained that he undertook his investigation of the origins of the Reichstag fire, at 
least initially, at the behest of senior officials of Lower Saxony. His mission was to 
investigate the past of a former Nazi official, from 1951 employed as the director 
of the criminal police of Lower Saxony, who had been attacked in the press for 
his failure in 1933 to investigate the possibility that the Reichstag fire had been 
set by Nazis. Tobias’ interpretation undermined the premises of this attack, since it 
suggested that, in fact, the Nazis had played no role in causing the fire. According to 
the memorandum, Tobias’ superiors encouraged him to pursue his research to help 
counter the “constant, demagogically not at all ineffective rabble-rousing attacks [by 
the East German government] against the Federal Republic, its leading personalities 
in the government, in the police, but also in the SPD and the unions.”7 At the time, 
Lower Saxony was governed by a coalition led by the Social Democratic Party.
Why does Hett consider this point so important? Governments often commission 
historical investigations of past events. If Tobias found evidence that exonerated West 
German police officials who had investigated the Reichstag fire in 1933 from having 
covered up Nazi responsibility for it, there is no reason for the historical profession 
to take umbrage. But Tobias’ 1963 memorandum raises some red flags. First, Tobias 
never revealed that he had received such an official commission and always claimed 
only to be concerned to learn the truth.8 An admission that his investigation had 
originated in an effort to defend a former Nazi police officer would have reduced 
the credibility of his findings, as Tobias certainly knew. Second, the fact that Tobias 
undertook his study in part to achieve a particular purpose could explain why he 
5 Hans Mommsen, “Der Reichstagsbrand und seine politischen Folgen,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 12 
(1964), p. 356.
6 Martin Broszat, The Hitler State. The foundation and development of the internal structure of the Third 
Reich, translated by John W. Hiden (London: Longman, 1981) is one notable example. 
7 March 9,1963 Memorandum by Fritz Tobias, quoted in Benjamin Hett, “‘This Story is about Something 
Fundamental’: Nazi Criminals, History, Memory, and the Reichstag Fire,” Central European History 48:2 
(June 2015): 210.
8 Fred Duswald and Fritz Tobias, Polit-Kriminalfall Reichstagsbrand Legende und Wirklichkeit (Tübingen: 
Grabert, 2011), pp. 28-9.
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suppressed evidence that differed with his interpretation, defamed individuals who 
differed with him, and in one instance may have stooped to blackmail.
What Hett adds to discussions of the origins of the Reichstag fire is above all 
a very careful evaluation of the testimony of key individuals who had in 1933 been 
in a position to learn inside information about the origins of the fire. Mommsen’s 
influential 1964 article briefly recounted various contradictory statements made by 
the members of this small group, and then concluded that none of these individuals 
could be relied upon, since they had either changed their views over time or were for 
other reasons not credible.9 Hett systematically investigates when different postwar 
statements were made and in what circumstances, and why certain individuals, such 
as the commander of the political department of the Berlin police in 1933, Rudolf 
Diels, might have changed his statements as his circumstances changed. The result 
is to bring greater coherence and clarity to the evidence. Hett suggests as a general 
conclusion the need to take seriously the statements of eye-witnesses and participants 
in historical events, such as Diels and also Hans Gisevius, another Berlin political 
police official in 1933, if the historian can corroborate significant aspects of their 
stories, even though not every detail of their accounts may be believable. Even if 
they contain contradictions and demonstrable errors, eye-witness accounts may 
nonetheless prove of great probative value when combined with other evidence.
A significant part of Hett’s book is based on the work of West German historians 
over the past two decades, notably Alexander Bahar and Wilfried Kugel, assistance 
Hett acknowledges. Bahar and Kugel’s Der Reichstagsbrand. Wie Geschichte 
gemacht wird contains much of the raw material on which Hett draws.10 Hett does 
not accept all of the evidence on which Bahar and Kugel rely and also develops 
further lines of inquiry. He is also more cautious in identifying the real culprits, 
especially as one moves up the chain of command in the Nazi Party hierarchy. 
Questions arise particularly with respect to how much Hitler knew. (pp. 320-1) But 
Hett, Bahar, and Kugel agree that van der Lubbe alone could not have caused a blaze 
of the dimensions of the Reichstag fire in the less than twenty minutes at his disposal 
and with the modest tools he used. All three rely heavily on the reports of experts 
on the setting of fires, both from 1933 and also since the 1970s. All present strong 
circumstantial evidence that an S.A. unit trained in the use of flammable liquids 
prepared the chamber for van der Lubbe by dousing the chairs, tables, and curtains 
with a chemical accelerant. And all three suggest that Tobias wrongly dismissed 
the evidence presented by Gisevius, whose 1946 memoirs linked the S.A. to the 
fire. Part of the significance of Hett’s book lies in his careful reexamination and 
confirmation of many of Bahar and Kugel’s findings. 
Noticeable by its absence from Hett’s study is mention of one early source of 
inside information about the origins of the fire: Hermann Rauschning. Rauschning, a 
leading member of the Danzig Nazi Party in 1933 and 1934 who broke with the Nazis 
and left Danzig in 1936, was the author of a famous book based on recollections of 
conversations he had overheard while meeting with Hitler and other leading Nazis. 
9 Mommsen, “Der Reichstagsbrand und seine politischen Folgen,” pp. 353-4.
10 Bahar and Kugel’s Der Reichstagsbrand. Wie Geschichte gemacht wird (Berlin: Edition q, 2001).
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In a book first published in 1939 as Hitler m’a dit, Rauschning claimed that in 1933 
he had heard Hermann Göring, then Prussian Interior Minister, call the Reichstag 
fire arsonists “his boys” and make a range of other comments indicating knowledge 
of how the fire was set.11 Since Rauschning himself later wondered whether one 
could take Göring entirely at his word, perhaps it made sense for Hett not to consider 
the evidence from Rauschning’s book. But Rauschning is another example of an 
eye-witness who, like Gisevius, was defamed by Tobias because he called Tobias’ 
version of the Reichstag fire into question. Like Gisevius, Rauschning deserves a 
more balanced approach.12 
Hett’s claim that Tobias employed blackmail to pressure the Institut für 
Zeitgeschichte into supporting his interpretation of the Reichstag fire is among 
the most serious of the charges he makes regarding Tobias’s methods. Hett quotes 
from a July 1962 letter that Tobias wrote to an editor of Der Spiegel, a Tobias ally 
in this historical war, in which Tobias claimed that the director of the Institut für 
Zeitgeschichte, Helmut Krausnick, was hiding the fact that he had been a Nazi Party 
member between 1932 and 1934. This information, Tobias wrote the Spiegel editor, 
could be used to pressure Krausnick into supporting Tobias’ interpretation of the 
origins of the Reichstag fire: “Krausnick trembles that his brown past will come 
out.” (p. 287) Hett also quotes from a letter Krausnick wrote Hans Mommsen at the 
end of September 1962 that shows that Krausnick knew of Tobias’ threat to reveal 
his Party membership, although this letter indicates that Krausnick thought Tobias 
was interested in revenge, not blackmail. (p. 288) In October 1962, Krausnick 
decided to cancel the publication of an article critical of Tobias’ interpretation in 
the institute’s history journal, the Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, an article 
Krausnick had commissioned in 1960. Hett concludes that this “could hardly be 
coincidental timing.” “[T]hrough threatening . . . Krausnick,” Hett writes, Tobias 
pushed the Institut für Zeitgeschichte “to grudging acceptance of [Tobias’] view . . . 
.” (pp. 291, 317; see also p. 289) The institute instead published Hans Mommsen’s 
article, which supported Tobias’ interpretation.
While Hett has shown that Tobias considered blackmail, he has not proven 
Tobias actually carried it out, or, if he had, that Krausnick acted in response to it: 
it is a possibility, not a demonstrated fact. Hett’s account suggests that there were 
other reasons that might have led to the withdrawal of the offer to publish the article 
critical of Tobias’s interpretation. Journals do reject articles, even ones their editors 
encourage authors to submit. What was distinctive about this rejection was that in 
a November 1962 letter to the author, Krausnick forbade him to publish elsewhere 
the manuscript he had prepared for the Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte and to 
11 Hermann Rauschning, Hitler m’a dit. Confidences du Führer sur son Plan de Conquête du Monde, 
translated by Albert Lehman (Paris: Cooperation, 1939) p. 98; Hermann Rauschning, Gespräche mit Hitler 
(Zürich: Europa Verlag, 2005), p. 76.
12 Studies that have urged a critical but not entirely dismissive approach to Rauschning’s book include Theodor 
Schieder, Hermann Rauschnings ‘Gespräche mit Hitler’ als Geschichtsquelle (Oplanden, Westdeutscher 
Verlag, 1972); Pia Nordblom, “Wider die These von der bewussten Fälschung. Bemerkungen zu den 
Gesprächen mit Hitler,” in Hermann Rauschning. Materialien und Beiträge zu einer politischen Biographie, 
Jürgen Hensel and Pia Nordblom, eds. (Osnabrück: fibre, 2003), 151-74; Marcus Pyka, Introduction to 
Gespräche mit Hitler, by Hermann Rauschning (Zürich: Europa Verlag, 2005), I-XV.
Compte rendu prolongé / Extended Book Review
176 Histoire sociale / Social History
cite in any future publication the documents regarding the Reichstag fire that he had 
obtained from the Institut für Zeitgeschichte. The institute in this way made itself a 
party to efforts to suppress expression of a point of view that it had come to consider 
erroneous. (pp. 289-93) The institute’s conduct was first revealed about fifteen 
years ago; Hett seeks to provide additional context.13 An alternative explanation 
might instead stress Krausnick’s desire that the institute not be associated with an 
apparently discredited, Communist inspired, interpretation of the Reichstag fire. 
Perhaps Krausnick feared that the institute might become a defendant in a libel suit 
if the author whose article it had commissioned published it elsewhere and used 
sources from the institute’s holdings. Hett shows that Tobias and his allies used 
suits brought under West German libel laws, as applied by a generally conservative 
judiciary, to stifle disagreement with their views of the Reichstag fire. 
Hett’s study teaches lessons of lasting relevance, especially, but not only, 
to historians of dictatorships that seek to shape the historical record to suit their 
interests. Historians of such governments and societies must become adept at drawing 
inferences from evidence that is not water-tight, since such regimes have the power 
to suppress documents and eliminate witnesses to create a historical record. The 
twentieth century is full of instances: among the best known are the Katyn Forest 
massacre of Polish army officers on Stalin’s orders in 1940 and Nazi killings of the 
handicapped, Jews, and Soviet POWs. Recent efforts of the Russian government to 
eliminate individuals who knew too much about or displayed too much curiosity 
regarding the apartment bombings that took place in Russia in September 1999 – an 
event that played a role in the development of Putin’s dictatorship analogous to that 
of the Reichstag fire in Germany – is a more recent example.14 
When Hett began his investigation of the Reichstag Fire in 2008, Fritz Tobias 
warned him about the dangers of the project. “Do you know what happens to people 
who write about the Reichstag fire?,” Tobias asked. (p. 328) Hett was not deterred. 
Courage was required both because the field had been so thoroughly ploughed 
and because taking a clear position on one side of the debate or the other, and in 
particular against the Tobias camp, would expose him to defamatory attacks on his 
professional abilities, something that, regrettably, Hett has had to endure. Historians 
of the Nazi period and of modern Europe should be grateful to Hett for pursuing this 
project despite the risks.
Eli Nathans
University of Western Ontario
13 “Zur Kontroverse über den Reichstagsbrand,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 49 (2001): 553; see also 
Hersch Fischler and Gerhard Brack, “Zur Kontroverse über den Reichstagsbrand. Stellungnahme zu der 
in der Julinummer der Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 2001 publizierte Notiz,” Vierteljahrshefte für 
Zeitgeschichte 50 (2002): 329-34.
14 David Satter, The Less You Know, The Better You Sleep. Russia’s Road to Terror and Dictatorship under Yeltsin 
and Putin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016); “The Litvinenko Inquiry. Report into the Death of 
Alexander Litvinenko,” January 2016, Chairman Robert Owen, accessed on October 20, 2016,  https://
www.litvinenkoinquiry.org/.../Litvinenko-Inquiry-Report-web-version.
